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The Significance of “Domicile” in Wong 
Kim Ark 
John C. Eastman 
Candidate Trump’s pledge during his 2015–2016 campaign for 
President to “End Birthright Citizenship,”1 and President Trump’s 
October 2018 assertion in an interview with Axios on HBO that he 
could end birthright citizenship by executive order,2 has brought the 
dispute over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause3 back to the forefront of our national discourse. 
The current perception among many (perhaps most) Americans, 
whether they agree with it or think it foolish, is that mere birth on 
U.S. soil results in automatic citizenship for the child, no matter the 
circumstances of the child’s parents’ presence in the United 
States—whether temporary or permanent, lawful, or unlawful. This 
common perception is bolstered by majority academic opinion, 
which contends that the question was settled by the Supreme Court 
 
  Henry Salvatori Professor of Law & Community Service, and former Dean, 
Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law; Senior Fellow at The Claremont 
Institute and Founding Director of the Institute’s Center for Constitutional 
Jurisprudence. This Article was prepared for the Chapman Law Review symposium 
honoring the life and work of the late Ron Rotunda, whom I had the privilege of recruiting 
to Chapman while I was serving as Dean. One of the things that distinguished Ron in the 
legal academy was his willingness to consider new arguments, and the topic here was no 
exception. In earlier editions of Ron’s constitutional law treatise, the section on the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause merely conveyed the modern understanding 
that mere birth on U.S. soil provided automatic citizenship to the newborn child, but after 
I informed him of the significant scholarship indicating that the modern understanding 
was contrary to the original understanding of the clause, Ron modified the section, 
indicating in a footnote that there were competing scholarly views on the subject. 
Compare 3 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 22.3 (1986); 
4 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 22.3 (2d ed. 1992); 
and 5 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 22.3 (3d ed. 
1999), with 6 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 22.3 (4th 
ed. 2009). Honest scholarship and debate were Ron’s hallmark, and I am delighted to 
present this Article in his memory. 
 1 Immigration Reform That Will Make America Great Again, TRUMP: MAKE 
AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! 1, 4 (2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20151231034321/https://www. 
donaldjtrump.com/images/uploads/Immigration-Reform-Trump.pdf [http://perma.cc/D6T4-D7m9]. 
 2 Jonathan Swan & Stef W. Kight, Exclusive: Trump targeting birthright 
citizenship with executive order, AXIOS (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.axios.com/trump-
birthright-citizenship-executive-order-0cf4285a-16c6-48f2-a933-bd71fd72ea82.html 
[http://perma.cc//TT3C-6R46]. 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
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over a century ago in the 1898 Wong Kim Ark case,4 in which the 
Court held that a child born on U.S. soil to Chinese parents who 
were not citizens (and because of a treaty between the U.S. and 
China could not become citizens) was nevertheless a citizen by 
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 
I have argued extensively elsewhere—in briefing before the 
Supreme Court,6 in legislative testimony,7 in articles both scholarly8 
and popular,9 and in numerous media appearances10—why I believe 
 
 4 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
 5 See, e.g., Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A Legislative History, 60 AM. U. L. 
REV. 331, 332–33 (2010). 
 6 See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional 
Jurisprudence In Support of Respondents, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696). 
 7 Birthright Citizenship: Is it the Right Policy for America?, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration and Border Security of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the H.R., 
114th Cong. 13 (2015) (statement of John C. Eastman), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/ 
JU01/20150429/103384/HHRG-114-JU01-Transcript-20150429.pdf [http://perma.cc/B2EV-
3LLK]; Birthright Citizenship State Compact Bill: Hearing Before S. Appropriations 
Comm., 50th Sess. (Ariz. Feb. 22, 2011) (statement of John C. Eastman),  
https://www.azleg.gov/archivedmeetings/?Year=2011 [http://perma.cc/R7CC-ARJX]; 
Birthright Citizenship State Compact Bill: Hearing Before S. Judiciary Comm., 
50th Sess, (Ariz. Feb. 7, 2011) (statement of John C. Eastman), https://www.azleg.gov/ 
archivedmeetings/?Year=2011 [http://perma.cc/R7CC-ARJX]; Dual Citizenship, Birthright 
Citizenship, and the Meaning of Sovereignty: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, 
Border Security, and Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the H.R., 109th Cong. 57–59 (Sept. 
29, 2005) (statement of John C. Eastman), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
109hhrg23690/html/CHRG-109hhrg23690.htm [http://perma.cc/6SYZ-U6ED]. 
 8 See generally John C. Eastman, From Plyler to Arizona: Have the Courts Forgotten 
About Corfield v. Coryell?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 165 (2013); John C. Eastman & Ediberto 
Roman, Debate on Birthright Citizenship, 6 FLA. INT’L U. L. Rev. 293 (2011); John C. 
Eastman, Born in the U.S.A.? Re-assessing Birthright Citizenship in the Wake of 9/11, 12 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 167 (2007) (reprinting congressional testimony); John C. Eastman, 
From Feudalism to Consent: Rethinking Birthright Citizenship, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 
30, 2006), https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/feudalism-consent-rethinking-
birthright-citizenship [http://perma.cc/Q4U9-ZVF5]. 
 9 See generally John C. Eastman, Trump is Right on Birthright Citizenship, DAILY 
CALLER (Nov. 2, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://dailycaller.com/2018/11/02/trump-right-birthright-
citizenship/ [http://perma.cc/34LK-2RZ3]; John C. Eastman, Revoking birthright 
citizenship would enforce the Constitution, N.Y. POST (Oct. 30, 2018, 6:55 PM), 
https://nypost.com/2018/10/30/revoking-birthright-citizenship-would-enforce-the-constitution/ 
[http://perma.cc/LF3K-XFMK]; John C. Eastman & Linda Chavez, Birthright Citizenship: 
Debate, CRB DIGITAL (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/birthright-
citizenship/ [http://perma.cc/P5EG-VZRB]; John C. Eastman, We Can Apply the 14th 
Amendment While Also Reforming Birthright Citizenship, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 24, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/08/birthright-citizenship-reform-it-without-repealing-
14th-amendment/ [http://perma.cc/NF85-QHD9]. 
 10 See, e.g., The California Report: Trump Considers Executive Order to End Birthright 
Citizenship (KQED radio broadcast Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.kqed.org/news/11702317/calexico-
mayor-calls-trumps-response-to-migrant-caravan-alarmist [http://perma.cc/XC7E-BTNP]; Steve 
Harman, Bye-Bye Baby: Trump Aims to End Birthright Citizenship, VOICE OF AM. (Oct. 30, 2018, 
9:43 AM), https://www.voanews.com/a/trump-aims-to-end-birthright-citizenship/4634978.html 
[http://perma.cc/E56D-QESS]; AirTalk Hosted by Larry Mantle: Can Trump end 
birthright citizenship – and should it end? (KPCC radio broadcast Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://www.scpr.org/programs/airtalk/2018/10/30/63847/can-trump-end-birthright-citizenship-
and-should-he/ [http://perma.cc/4H82-WKN5]; All Things Considered: Trump Claims He Will 
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the predominate modern understanding of the Citizenship Clause is 
incorrect. The short version? The Citizenship Clause actually 
contains two components for automatic citizenship: 1) birth on U.S. 
soil; and 2) being “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.11 
Contrary to the modern understanding, the phrase “subject to the 
jurisdiction” is not synonymous with “subject to the laws,” which for 
those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment was 
merely a partial or territorial jurisdiction. Rather, for them, “subject 
to the jurisdiction” meant subject to the “complete” jurisdiction, 
“[n]ot owing allegiance to anybody else.”12 In other words, as the 
Supreme Court noted when it first addressed the clause in 1872, 
just four years after the Amendment’s adoption: “The phrase, 
‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its 
operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of 
foreign States born within the United States.”13 
Admittedly, that language in the Supreme Court’s 1872 
Slaughter-House decision was not necessary to the case’s holding and 
is therefore dicta. But it became a holding a decade later in a case 
involving John Elk, a Native American born in the United States 
who later renounced his tribal allegiance and claimed citizenship by 
virtue of the Citizenship Clause.14 The Supreme Court rejected his 
claim, holding that Elk was not at the time of his birth “subject to the 
jurisdiction” of the United States, which required that he be “not 
merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the 
United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, 
 
End Birthright Citizenship Through Executive Order (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 30, 2018, 
4:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/30/662253537/trump-claims-he-will-end-birthright-
citizenship-through-executive-order [http://perma.cc/GC4H-NMS7]; The Larry Elder Show 
(KRLA-Salem Radio Network radio broadcast Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.larryelder.com/show-
archive/page/6/ [http://perma.cc/P575-DX3R]; The Ingraham Angle (Fox News Channel 
television broadcast Oct. 30, 2018), https://video.foxnews.com/v/5855619416001/?#sp=show-
clips [http://perma.cc/EGV2-5Y3A]; The Dennis Prager Show: Truth vs. Leftism (KRLA-Los 
Angeles radio broadcast Nov. 1, 2018), https://pragertopia.com/2018/11/01/prager-20181101-1-
truth-vs-leftism/ [http://perma.cc/2LLE-W2RX]; James Ho & John C. Eastman, Birthright 
Citizenship and the 14th Amendment (C-SPAN television broadcast Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?328772-1/discussion-birthright-citizenship [http://perma.cc/C3Y6-AL8U]; 
Doug McIntyre Show (WCBS-New York radio broadcast Aug. 20, 2015); McIntyre in the 
Morning (KABC-Los Angeles radio broadcast Aug. 20, 2015); On Point, (NPR radio broadcast 
Aug. 9, 2010); Interview with Ji-Eun Lee (Munhwa Broadcasting Corp. broadcast Feb. 12, 
2009); Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News Channel television broadcast Dec. 14, 2007); 
The Paula Zahn Show (CNN television broadcast Dec. 31, 2005). See also Press Conference at 
the National Press Club (Aug. 10, 2010) (participating media outlets included Politico, Federal 
News Service, Congressional Quarterly, Amnesty International, Fox News, Talk Radio News, 
Congressional Quarterly, Center for American Progress, Dallas Morning News, Human 
Events, GAO, World Journal, Think Progress, Eagle Forum, and Voice of America). 
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 12 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2893 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull).  
 13 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872) (emphasis added). 
 14 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
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and owing them direct and immediate allegiance”—a test he could 
not meet because, at his birth, Elk “owed immediate allegiance” to 
this tribe and not to the United States.15 
The Citizenship Clause therefore bestowed automatic 
citizenship on those born in the United States who were subject 
not merely to the partial, territorial jurisdiction applicable to 
anyone physically present within our borders (save for diplomats 
and invading armies), but who were subject to the complete, 
political jurisdiction, in the sense of owing allegiance to the 
United States. As Thomas Cooley, the leading treatise writer of 
the era, described it, “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United 
States “meant full and complete jurisdiction to which citizens are 
generally subject, and not any qualified and partial jurisdiction, 
such as may consist with allegiance to some other government.”16 
That would seem to have settled the matter. 
But fourteen years after the decision in Elk, and thirty 
years after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court ruled that Wong Kim Ark, who had been born in 
1873 to parents of Chinese origin who were still subjects of the 
Emperor of China and not U.S. citizens, was a citizen because 
he had been born on U.S. soil.17 My goal here is not to revisit 
the correctness of that decision, or to review the extensive 
evidence that I believe demonstrates that Chief Justice Fuller 
had the better of the argument in his dissent, but rather to 
focus on one critically important aspect of the case that rather 
dramatically limits the scope of the case’s holding (as opposed to 
its more expansive dicta) in a way that is directly relevant to 
the current dispute about whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
mandates automatic citizenship for the children of parents 
unlawfully present in the United States. 
That critical aspect of the case is the word “domicile,” which 
appears twenty-four times in the majority opinion and 
introductory statement of facts, and another four times in the 
dissent.18 The “question presented,” as stated by Justice Gray,  
[I]s whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese 
descent, who at the time of his birth are subjects of the emperor of 
China, but have a permanent domicile and residence in the United 
States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in 
 
 15 Id. at 94, 99, 102. 
 16 THOMAS COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 243 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2001) (1880). 
 17 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653, 704 (1898). 
 18 The words “resident” or “residence” appear an additional thirty-two times in the 
majority opinion, and twelve times in the dissent. See generally id.  
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any diplomatic or official capacity under the emperor of China, 
becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by 
virtue of the first clause of the fourteenth amendment of the 
constitution: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the state wherein they reside.”19 
The fact that Wong Kim Ark’s parents were “domiciled 
residents of the United States” at the time of Wong Kim Ark’s 
birth in 1873, “and had established and enjoyed a permanent 
domicile and residence therein at said city and county of San 
Francisco,” California, was explicitly part of the agreed-upon 
facts on which the case had been submitted to the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California for decision.20 
Justice Gray repeated that factual stipulation at the outset of his 
opinion: “They [Wong Kim Ark’s parents] were at the time of his 
birth domiciled residents of the United States, having previously 
established and are still enjoying a permanent domicile and 
residence therein at San Francisco.”21 He also noted, per the 
factual stipulation, that Wong Kim Ark, himself,  
ever since his birth, has had but one residence, to wit, in California, 
within the United States and has there resided, claiming to be a 
citizen of the United States, and has never lost or changed that 
residence, or gained or acquired another residence; and neither he, 
nor his parents acting for him, ever renounced his allegiance to the 
United States.22  
Although Justice Gray used the word “residence” rather than 
“domicile” when describing Wong Kim Ark’s circumstances, it 
was (and is) well established, as Justice Joseph Story noted in his 
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, that “the place of birth of 
a person is considered as his domicil[e], if it is at the time of his 
birth the domicil[e] of his parents.”23 
“Domicile” is, of course, a legal term of art. According to 
Black’s Law Dictionary, it is “[t]hat place in which a man has 
voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself and family, not for a 
mere special or temporary purpose, but with the present 
intention of making a permanent home, until some unexpected 
event shall occur to induce him to adopt some other permanent 
 
 19 Id. at 653 (emphasis added). 
 20 Id. at 650–51 (emphasis added). 
 21 Id. at 652 (emphasis added). 
 22 Id. 
 23 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND 
DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD 
TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS § 46, at 44 (Boston, 
Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1834) (emphasis added). 
Do Not Delete 5/23/2019 1:22 PM 
306 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:2 
home.”24 “It is his legal residence, as distinguished from his 
temporary place of abode.”25 “Legal residence” is in turn defined 
as “the term applied to the place a person spends most of his time 
and is the home that is recognised by law.”26 Or, as the Seventh 
Circuit put it in In re Garneau, it is the place where a person 
“exercises his political rights.”27 
Thus, by repeatedly describing Wong Kim Ark’s parents as 
“domiciled” in the United States, the actual holding in the case 
addressed only children born in the United States to parents who 
are domiciled in the United States, which is to say, have their 
“legal residence” in the United States.28 
Chief Justice Fuller, joined by Justice Harlan, contested 
even this in his dissent.29 Though “domiciled” in the United 
States, Wong Kim Ark’s parents (and hence Wong Kim Ark 
himself) could not be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United 
States in the complete, political sense intended by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, he argued, because by treaty they were 
not allowed to become citizens but remained “subjects” of the 
Emperor of China, to whom they therefore continued to owe 
allegiance.30 Whether or not Chief Justice Fuller was correct on 
that score (and I contend that he was), the majority opinion could 
not extend further than the facts of the case warranted, namely, 
that children born to parents who are domiciled in the United 
States are sufficiently “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United 
States that the Fourteenth Amendment bestows on them 
automatic citizenship upon birth.31 As Justice Gray himself noted 
when discounting the contrary language in the Slaughter-House 
Cases cited above:  
[I]t is well to bear in mind the often-quoted words of Chief Justice 
Marshall: ‘It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general 
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the 
 
 24 Domicile, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) (citing In re Garneau, 127 F. 677 
(7th Cir. 1904)). 
 25 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Town of Salem v. Town of Lyme, 29 Conn. 74 (1860)). 
 26 Legal Residence, THE LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/legal-residence/ 
[http://perma.cc/5MLZ-FWP7] (emphasis added). 
 27 In re Garneau, 127 F. at 678. 
 28 Had Justice Gray considered the full scope of the requirements for “domicile,” 
including that it is the place where one exercises “political rights,” he might have realized 
that the treaty prohibition on Chinese immigrants exercising political rights would have 
prevented them from being deemed “domiciled” in the United States. Nevertheless, the 
actual holding of the case is limited to those who are so “domiciled.” 
 29 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 706–10 (1898) (Fuller, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 30 Id. at 725–26. 
 31 One could even argue that the actual holding is narrower still, limited to those 
domiciled in the United States who were barred by treaty from ever becoming citizens. 
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case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, 
they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a 
subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision.32 
Chief Justice Marshall’s long-standing distinction between 
holding and dicta33 is particularly germane in assessing the scope of 
Wong Kim Ark’s holding, because language in Justice Gray’s 
opinion that appears to apply more broadly than to those domiciled 
in the United States is, at times, patently wrong—errors that likely 
would have not been made had the precise issue been before the 
Court. In one glaring example, Justice Gray quoted Justice Joseph 
Story for the proposition that “[p]ersons who are born in a country 
are generally deemed citizens and subjects of that country,”34 but 
he omitted the very next sentence in Justice Story’s treatise, 
namely, that a “reasonable qualification of the rule would seem to 
be, that it should not apply to the children of parents, who were in 
itinere [traveling] in the country, or who were abiding there for 
temporary purposes, as for health, or curiosity, or occasional 
business.”35 Although Justice Story acknowledged that “[i]t would 
be difficult . . . to assert, that in the present state of public law such 
a qualification is universally established,”36 Justice Gray’s omission 
of the qualification altogether erroneously implies that the opposite 
was universally established. 
Justice Story’s caveat directly addresses several of the 
modern issues that might well be, but have not previously 
been, presented to the Court. Does “subject to the jurisdiction” 
cover children born to those who are in the United States 
lawfully but only temporarily, such as those on tourist, 
student, or work visas (temporary sojourners, to use the 
language of the day)? Does it also extend to children born to 
those who have overstayed their visas and become unlawfully 
present in the United States? And can it possibly also extend 
to children born to those who were never lawfully admitted 
into the United States in the first place? Honest scholars who 
argue for such a broad interpretation of the Citizenship Clause 
 
 32 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 679 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 
264, 399 (1821)). 
 33 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000 
(1994) (discussing accuracy as being the “primary virtue” for Chief Justice Marshall’s 
dicta-holding distinction). 
 34 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 661 (quoting STORY, supra note 23, § 48). 
 35 STORY, supra note 23, § 48. 
 36 Id. Great Britain, for example, did not recognize the qualification that Story 
recognized was otherwise nearly universally accepted. 
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concede that the Supreme Court has never held that such 
individuals are citizens.37 
Another example: Justice Gray claimed that the English 
common law rule of jus soli “was in force” not only “in all the 
English colonies upon this continent down to the time of the 
Declaration of Independence,” as it clearly was, but also “in the 
United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the 
constitution as originally established.”38 The latter point is 
patently erroneous. The English common law rule, accurately 
described by Justice Gray, is that: 
[E]very person born within the dominions of the crown, no matter 
whether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case, 
whether the parents were settled, or merely temporarily sojourning, 
in the country, was an English subject, save only the children of 
foreign ambassadors (who were excepted because their fathers carried 
their own nationality with them), or a child born to a foreigner during 
the hostile occupation of any part of the territories of England.39 
Being an “English subject” also meant under the law of jus soli, 
owing “permanent allegiance to the crown.”40 The Declaration of 
Independence is not just a thorough repudiation of that old 
feudal idea of “permanent allegiance,” but perhaps the most 
eloquent repudiation of it ever written. 
 
 37 See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Indians and Invaders: The Citizenship Clause and 
Illegal Aliens, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 499, 500 n.5 (2008) (noting that the principle that 
any child born on U.S. soil (save to diplomats) “does not rest on any judicial holding. It is 
based instead on dictum from the Wong Kim Ark case and longstanding practice”); Ronald 
Rizzo, Born in the USA but Not A Citizen? How the Birth Visa Can Solve Today’s 
Immigration Challenges, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 393, 403 (2014) (“Wong Kim Ark 
made absolutely no holding regarding children born to illegal aliens and temporary 
visitors on U.S. soil.”); David A. Martin, Membership and Consent: Abstract or Organic?, 
11 YALE J. INT'L L. 278, 280-81 (1985) (likewise noting that language in Wong Kim Ark 
extending beyond children of lawfully domiciled parents is “dictum”); Katherine Nesler, 
Resurgence of the Birthright Citizenship Debate, 55 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 235 (2017) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has not addressed a case directly on whether children born to 
undocumented immigrants on United States soil are automatically granted citizenship by 
virtue of birth within United States.”); Katherine Pettit, Addressing the Call for the 
Elimination of Birthright Citizenship in the United States: Constitutional and Pragmatic 
Reasons to Keep Birthright Citizenship Intact, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 265, 268 (2006) 
(“The Supreme Court has yet to decide specifically whether this principle applies to a 
person whose parents are in the United States illegally.”); Alberto R. Gonzales, An 
Immigration Crisis in A Nation of Immigrants: Why Amending the Fourteenth 
Amendment Won’t Solve Our Problems, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1859, 1868 (2012) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has yet to rule on birthright citizenship or the interpretation of ‘subject to the 
jurisdiction’ in the context of a child born in the United States to unauthorized immigrants.”). 
 38 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 659.  
 39 Id. at 657 (quoting LORD CHIEF JUSTICE COCKBURN, COCKBURN ON NATIONALITY 7). 
 40 Id. (quoting A.V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 173–77, 741 (n.p., Sweet & Maxwell 1896). 
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The Declaration begins with a statement that it had become 
necessary for the American people “to dissolve the political bands 
which ha[d] connected them” to the English people.41 It then 
asserts as a “self-evident” truth: 
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of [the 
end of securing the unalienable rights with which the people are 
endowed by their Creator], it is the Right of the People to alter or to 
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on 
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them 
shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.42 
And if it were not clear enough from those two statements that the 
Americans were repudiating the notion that they owed perpetual 
allegiance to the English crown, the language of the closing 
paragraph is unmistakable, declaring that “these United Colonies 
are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they 
are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all 
political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, 
and ought to be totally dissolved . . . .”43 The notion that the English 
common law of jus soli therefore continued unabated after the 
Declaration of Independence could not be more mistaken. 
Much of the evidence Justice Gray marshalled in support of 
his conclusion likewise suffers from a lack of care that might not 
have been the case had the broader question actually been at 
issue. By way of example, Justice Gray cited several cases for the 
unobjectionable proposition that “[t]he interpretation of the 
[C]onstitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by 
the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the 
English common law, and are to be read in light of its history.”44 
What he failed to mention is that the general rule about using 
the common law as a rule of interpretation only applies to the 
extent that the common law was compatible with the principles 
of the American Revolution. As Justice Story noted in his 1829 
opinion in Van Ness v. Pacard, “The common law of England is 
not to be taken in all respects to be that of America. Our 
ancestors brought with them its general principles, and claimed 
it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted 
 
 41 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 42 Id. at para. 2. 
 43 Id. at para. 32 (emphasis added). 
 44 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655 (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 
(1888)); see also id. at 654–55 (citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874); 
Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422 (1885); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–25 
(1886); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888); and Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 
270, 274 (1875)). 
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only that portion which was applicable to their situation.”45 
Indeed, long before Justice Gray treated the common law as an 
obligatory and indisputable governing principle in the United States, 
the California Supreme Court had much more accurately described 
that the rule was just the opposite.46 There was, that court claimed: 
[N]o doctrine better settled, than that such portions of the law of 
England as are not adapted to our condition, form no part of the law of 
this State. This exception includes not only such laws as are 
inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions, but such as are framed 
with special reference to the physical condition of a country differing 
widely from our own. It is contrary to the spirit of the common law 
itself to apply a rule founded on a particular reason, to a case where 
that reason utterly fails. Cesante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex. [The 
reason for a law ceasing, the law itself ceases].47 
In short, “[t]he principles of the common law have been 
adopted in this country only so far as applicable to the habits and 
condition of our society, and in harmony with the genius, spirit, 
and objects of our institutions.”48 They are not applicable 
 
 45 Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829); see also Shively v. Bowlby, 
152 U.S. 1, 52 (1894); Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437, 455 (1850); Murray v. Chi. 
& N.W. Ry. Co., 62 F. 24, 27 (1894) (“[W]hen the [C]onstitution of the United States was 
adopted, the general rules of the common law, in so far as they were applicable to the 
conditions then existing in the colonies, and subject to the modifications necessary to adapt 
them to the uses and needs of the people, were recognized and were in force in the colonies 
. . . .” (emphasis added)); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 363 (1851) (“The 
colonists who established the English colonies in this country, undoubtedly brought with 
them the common and statute laws of England, as they stood at the time of their 
emigration, so far as they were applicable to the situation and local circumstances of the 
colony.” (emphasis added)); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE 
AMERICAN UNION 31–32 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 1999) (1883); 1 JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 537 (Fred B. Rothman Publ’ns 1999) (1873) (“[T]he 
common law, so far as it is applicable to our situation and government, has been 
recognized and adopted, as one entire system, by the constitutions of Massachusetts, New 
York, New Jersey, and Maryland. It has been assumed by the courts of justice, or declared 
by statute, with the like modifications, as the law of the land in every state. It was 
imported by our colonial ancestors, as far as it was applicable . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 46 See Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136 (1857). 
 47 Id. at 142–43 (quoting Starr v. Child, 20 Wend. 149 (N.Y. 1838) (Bronson, J., dissenting)). 
 48 Pierson v. Lane, 14 N.W. 90, 92 (Iowa 1882); see also, e.g., Ex parte Holman, 28 
Iowa 88, 126 (1869) (“The courts of this country unite in holding that the common law, so 
far as it is suited to the condition of our people and accords with our institutions, is the 
law of the land.” (emphasis added)); Wagner v. Bissell, 3 Iowa 396, 403 (1856) (“[W]here 
[the common law] has been varied by custom, not founded in reason, or not consonant to 
the genius and manners of the people, it ceases to have force.”); Brief for Respondents at 
316, People v. Van Rensselaer, 9 N.Y. 291 (1853) (“There is this necessary limitation 
implied [upon adoption of the common law by British subjects in new territories], that 
they carry with them all the laws applicable to their situation, and not repugnant to the 
local and political circumstances in which they are placed.”); Brief for Plaintiff at 117, 
Whitney v. Powell, 2 Pin. 115, 117 (Wis. 1849), 1849 WL 3235, at *2 (“The common law of 
England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America.”); Ex parte Hickey, 12 
Miss. (4 S. & M.) 751, 776–77 (1845) (“The United States have not taken, in all respects, 
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otherwise, and the common law jus soli principle of perpetual and 
irrevocable allegiance is simply incompatible with the doctrine of 
consent explicated in the Declaration of Independence. 
Chief Justice Fuller correctly noted in his dissent this 
significant caveat about the general applicability of the common 
law in the United States when he stated,  
Manifestly, when the sovereignty of the crown was thrown off, and an 
independent government established, every rule of the common law, and 
every statute of England obtaining in the colonies, in derogation of the 
principles on which the new government was founded, was abrogated.49 
But Justice Gray chose not to engage him on the point, 
simply asserting, without any of the necessary nuance that the 
subject deserved (and directly contrary to the express language of 
the Declaration of Independence), that the English common law 
rule of jus soli was “in force” after the Declaration “and continued 
to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.”50 
Such manifest errors on matters collateral to the holding of a 
case is precisely why John Marshall’s old maxim about dicta is so 
important. As Justice Gray himself noted: 
The reason of [John Marshall’s] maxim [regarding dicta] is obvious. The 
question actually before the court is investigated with care, and 
considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to 
illustrate it are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their 
possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.51 
Viewed through that lens, much of the case authority relied 
on by Justice Gray is irrelevant to the issues that remain to be 
addressed. That “citizenship by birth was the law of the English 
colonies in America” and during the time that New York City was 
under British occupation during the war—the issue confronted 
by the Court in Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor52—tells us nothing 
about whether, or the extent to which, the principles of the 
Declaration repudiated the common law of jus soli. Indeed, 
another aspect of that case, built on the uncertainty about the 
 
the common law of England. So much only of its general principles are claimed and 
adopted which is applicable to our situation, institutions and form of government.”); 
Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 646 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (noting that the colonists “brought 
with them as a birth-right and inheritance, so much of the common law as was applicable 
to their local situation and change of circumstances”); Brief for Executor at 205, Gilbert 
v. Heirs of Richards, 7 Vt. 203 (1835) (“Such part only of the common law of England, is 
adopted here ‘as is applicable to the local situation and circumstances’ of this state.”). 
 49 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 709 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
 50 Id. at 658 (majority opinion). 
 51 Id. at 679 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821)). 
 52 Id. at 659 (citing Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830)).  
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timing of the John Inglis’s birth,53 demonstrates that the rule set 
down in the majority opinion in Inglis is just the opposite of that 
which was attributed to it by Justice Gray’s dicta. Addressing the 
period of time between the Declaration of Independence in July 
1776, and the occupation of New York by the British army in 
September 1776 (i.e., when the City was “in the United States” 
and not under occupation by a foreign army), the Court held: 
If born after the 4th of July 1776, and before the 15th of September of 
the same year, when the British took possession of New York, his 
infancy incapacitated him from making any election for himself, and 
his election and character followed that of his father, subject to the 
right of disaffirmance in a reasonable time after the termination of his 
minority; which never having been done, he remains a British subject, 
and disabled from inheriting the land in question.54 
The italicized language is inaccurate under the pure form of jus 
soli claimed by Justice Gray, for the status of the father is 
irrelevant if the child is born on the soil of the sovereign. To 
repeat the prior language of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, quoted 
by Justice Gray earlier in the opinion: 
By the common law of England, every person born within the 
dominions of the crown, no matter whether of English or of foreign 
parents, and, in the latter case, whether the parents were settled, or 
merely temporarily sojourning, in the country, was an English subject, 
save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who were excepted 
because their fathers carried their own nationality with them), or a 
child born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any part of 
the territories of England.55  
Justice Gray similarly ignored a key component of Justice 
Swayne’s decision in U.S. v. Rhodes56 while riding circuit. The 
issue in that case was the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act, which, as Justice Swayne noted, provided that 
anyone “born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign 
 
 53 Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 120–21 (noting that whether John Inglis was born before 
or after July 4, 1776 was essential to the Court’s decision). 
 54 Id. at 126 (emphasis added). Language to the contrary in the concurring opinion of 
Justice Johnson was based on the fact that the State of New York had expressly adopted the 
common law (including the rule of jus soli), not that the rule applied after the Declaration of 
Independence absent any such adoption by the positive law. See id. at 135–36 (Johnson, J., 
concurring) (“By the twenty-fifth article of the constitution of New York of 1777, the common 
law of England is adopted into the jurisprudence of the state. By the principles of that law, 
the demandant owed allegiance to the king of Great Britain, as of his province of New York. 
By the revolution that allegiance was transferred to the state, and the common law declares 
that the individual cannot put off his allegiance by any act of his own.”). 
 55 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 657 (quoting LORD CHIEF JUSTICE COCKBURN, 
COCKBURN ON NATIONALITY 7). 
 56 27 F. Cas. 785, 786 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866). 
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power,” was a citizen and therefore able to testify in court.57 
Nancy Talbot was, Justice Swayne held, “a citizen of the United 
States of the African race, having been born in the United States, 
and not subject to any foreign power.”58 His later description of 
the common law of jus soli is therefore pure dicta. 
Most egregious, though, was Justice Gray’s reliance on the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Benny v. O’Brien59 as 
support for his broad claim that “[t]he [F]ourteenth [A]mendment 
affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth 
within the territory” for all children here born of resident aliens 
except diplomats and occupying armies.60 Benny, like Wong Kim 
Ark itself, involved parents who were “domiciled” in the United 
States,61 and so its holding is likewise limited to that context. But 
the New Jersey Supreme Court was also quite explicit in noting 
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide automatic 
citizenship beyond that. “Two facts must concur” for there to be 
automatic citizenship, it held.62 “[T]he person must be born here, 
and he must be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
according to the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, which means, 
according to the [C]ivil [R]ights [A]ct, that the person born here 
is not subject to any foreign power.”63 The two provisions—that 
is, the Civil Rights Act and the Citizenship Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—“by implication concede that there may 
be instances in which the right to citizenship does not attach by 
reason of birth in this country,” the court stated.64 And contrary 
to Justice Gray’s claim, those exceptions involved not just the 
children of diplomats or invading armies: “Persons intended to be 
excepted are only those born in this country of foreign parents 
who are temporarily traveling here, and children born of persons 
resident here in the diplomatic service of foreign governments.”65 
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that the 
phrases “subject to the jurisdiction” and “not subject to any 
foreign power” were both intended to exclude temporary visitors 
confirms that the phrases meant complete, political jurisdiction, 
not a partial, territorial jurisdiction. And it comports with a key 
 
 57 Id. at 786 (emphasis added) (quoting An act to protect all persons in the United States 
in their civil rights, and to furnish the means for their vindication, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866)). 
 58 Id. at 785.  
 59 32 A. 696 (N.J. 1895). 
 60 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 693. 
 61 Benny, 32 A. at 696. 
 62 Id. at 697. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 698 (emphasis added). 
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discussion during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment 
in the Senate. Shortly after Senator Howard introduced the 
language that was to become the Citizenship Clause, Senator 
Cowan asked: “Is the child of the Chinese immigrant in 
California a citizen [under the language of the proposed 
amendment]? Is the child of a Gypsy born in Pennsylvania a 
citizen? If so, what rights have they? Have they any more rights 
than a sojourner in the United States?”66 Senator Conness 
responded that the amendment would grant citizenship to the 
children of Chinese living in California and Gypsies living in 
Pennsylvania,67 but his response must be read in light of the 
distinction that Senator Cowan himself had made between the 
Chinese and Gypsies to whom he was referring and “sojourners.” In 
other words, by asking whether children of the Chinese and Gypsies 
were to be given “more rights than a sojourner,” Senator Cowan was 
necessarily referring to Chinese and Gypsies who were not mere 
sojourners (temporary visitors), but who were instead permanently 
domiciled in the United States and not owing allegiance to any 
foreign power. Far from establishing that the Citizenship Clause 
guarantees citizenship to everyone born on U.S. soil no matter the 
circumstances of their parents, as several scholars have claimed,68 
this important colloquy therefore demonstrates just the opposite. 
Citizenship would not be limited to white Europeans, as prior 
naturalization acts had done, but neither would it be extended to 
the children born on U.S. soil to parents who were merely 
temporary visitors—sojourners—to the United States.69 
This is precisely the interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment given by the New Jersey Supreme Court, Justice 
Gray’s claims notwithstanding: “The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, 
by the language, ‘all persons born in the United States and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ was intended to bring all 
races, without distinction of color, within the rule, which, prior to 
that time, pertained to the white race,” stated the court.70 It 
therefore extended to a child “of alien parents, who at the time of 
his birth were domiciled in this country.”71 But it did not extend 
 
 66 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866) (emphasis added) (remarks of 
Sen. Edgar Cowan). 
 67 Id. at 2892 (remarks of Sen. John Conness). 
 68 See, e.g., Epps, supra note 5, at 356; James C. Ho, Defining “American”: Birthright 
Citizenship and the Original Understanding of the 14th Amendment, 9 GREEN BAG 367, 
368 (2d ed. 2006).  
 69 In any event, if Senator Conness’s comments can be read to suggest that anyone born 
on U.S. soil were to become citizens no matter the circumstances of their parents, it is 
significant that none of the other supporters of the Citizenship Clause embraced that position.  
 70 Benny, 32 A. at 698. 
 71 Id. 
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to “those born in this country of foreign parents who are 
temporarily traveling here.”72 
The Executive Branch of the federal government likewise 
recognized—both before and for two-thirds of a century after the 
decision in Wong Kim Ark—that more than mere birth on U.S. 
soil was required for the grant of automatic citizenship. With the 
exception of wartime, when passports could be issued to 
non-citizen members of the military who took an oath of 
allegiance,73 only American citizens have been eligible for 
passports since 1856, so proof of citizenship has been required 
when applying for a passport.74 But shortly after the Court’s 
decision in Elk v. Wilkins, the passport office adopted a form for 
use by any “native citizen” applying for a passport that required, 
inter alia, the following information: 1) city, state, and date of 
birth in the United States; 2) whether the father was a native or 
naturalized citizen; 3) confirmation that the individual was 
domiciled in the United States, including the city and state of 
permanent residence; and 4) an oath of allegiance to the United 
States.75 Information about the father’s status continued until it 
was inexplicably dropped as a requirement in 1967.76 If birth on 
United States soil alone was sufficient for citizenship, the 
information about the father’s citizenship status would not have 
been necessary. 
Similarly, as Chief Justice Fuller noted in his Wong Kim Ark 
dissenting opinion, Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen 
rendered an opinion in 1885 that a child born on U.S. soil to Saxon 
parents who were “temporarily in the United States” was not a 
citizen because, through his parents, he was subject to a foreign 
power.77 Moreover, Frederick Frelinghuysen’s successor as 
Secretary of State, Thomas Bayard, rendered the same opinion in 
 
 72 Id. 
 73 An Act For enrolling and calling out the national Forces, and for other Purposes, 
ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 731, 731 (1863) (exempting from the citizen requirement foreign-born 
males between the ages of twenty and forty-five “who shall have declared on oath their 
intention to become citizens” and who were therefore obligated to military service by An 
Act for enrolling and calling out the national Forces, and for other Purposes).  
 74 An Act To regulate the Diplomatic and Consider Systems of the United States, ch. 
127, § 23, 11 Stat. 52, 60–61 (1856). 
 75 GAILLARD HUNT, THE STATE DEP’T, THE AMERICAN PASSPORT: ITS HISTORY AND A 
DIGEST OF LAWS, RULINGS, AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING ITS ISSUANCE BY THE DEPARTMENT 
OF STATE 64 (Wash., Gov’t Printing Office 1898). 
 76 See 22 C.F.R. § 33.23 (1938) (requiring for “native citizen” applications, inter alia, 
“the name, date and place of birth, and place of residence of the applicant’s father”); but 
see 22 C.F.R. § 51.43 (1967) (requiring only proof of birth in the United States). 
 77 Frederick Frelinghuysen, Hausding’s Case: Frelinghuysen, Sec’y of State, to 
Kasson, 1885, 2 Wharton’s Digest 399 (1885) in CASES AND OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 222–23 (Boston, The Bos. Book Co. 1893). 
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Richard Greisser’s case. Greisser was born in Ohio in 1867 to a 
father who was a German subject and domiciled in Germany.78 
Greisser was therefore not a citizen, according to Secretary of 
State Bayard, because he was “‘subject to a foreign power,’ and 
‘not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.’”79  
In sum, the distinction between sojourners and those 
permanently domiciled in the United States was made during the 
debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, in state court judicial 
opinions, and by the actual practice of the passport office. These 
distinctions indicate that the mandate of automatic citizenship 
was not understood to apply to children of temporary visitors to 
the United States. Of course, if the Citizenship Clause does not 
mandate automatic citizenship for children born to parents who 
are temporarily, but lawfully, visiting the United States, it 
necessarily does not extend citizenship to the children of those 
who are unlawfully visiting the United States. In both cases, the 
parents are subject only to the partial, territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States in the sense that they must comport with the 
laws while physically present within the borders of the United 
States. But they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States in the broader sense intended by the Fourteenth 
Amendment because they are not subject to the complete, 
political jurisdiction. For their temporary sojourn to the territory 
of the United States brings with it only a temporary obligation to 
obey her laws, not a full allegiance to her sovereignty.  
One might well argue that even children whose parents are 
“domiciled” in the United States, but who remain subjects or 
citizens of a foreign power, do not meet the test of the Citizenship 
Clause as it was originally understood, and that even the more 
limited holding of Wong Kim Ark was therefore incorrect. But it 
should be acknowledged that the treaty between the United States 
and the Emperor of China that gave rise to the Wong Kim Ark 
case was ignoble because it refused to afford to Chinese subjects 
the same inalienable right to reject their prior allegiance that 
Americans had claimed as an unalienable, natural right in 1776.80 
Perhaps Justice Gray was doing no more than counter-balancing 
the pernicious effects of that treaty, acknowledging that because 
Chinese parents who had become lawfully and permanently 
domiciled in the United States had demonstrated their allegiance 
to their adopted country as much as the treaty allowed them to do, 
 
 78 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 719 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 79 Id. (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).  
 80 See id. at 701–02.  
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any children born to them on U.S. soil should enjoy the benefits of 
citizenship. But that concern no longer exists—“Cessante Ratione 
Legis, Cessat Ipsa Lex” (the reason for a law ceasing, the law itself 
ceases).81 Thus, to extend the mandate of automatic citizenship to 
the entirely different context of temporary visitors, and even 
further to the context of those who have entered this country 
illegally, pushes well beyond any such sentiment, and certainly 



























 81 Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136 (1857). 
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